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BLACK LUNG CLAIMS AND APPEALS IN
THE THIRD CIRCUIT: WHICH WAY DO I GO?
MANCIA v DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS
I.

INTRODUCTION

"A desperate disease requires a dangerous remedy."'
One effect of the worldwide industrial revolution during the past two
centuries has been an increased demand for vast amounts of fossil fuel,
namely coal. 2 The workers who mined this coal were confronted with
many dangers along the way. 3 Although the reality of workers' injuries
and the effect that industrialization had on cities has been chronicled by
novelists and public commentators, many of the causal relationships between the working environment and the ill effects on employee health
were not established until well into the twentieth century. 4 One specific
danger that was not recognized by Congress until 1969 was the effect of
1. Guy FAWKES, CONSPIRATOR IN THE GUNPOWDER PLOT (1606), quoted in THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992).
2. SeeJoseph L. Sax, The Limits of PrivateRights in Public Waters, 19 ENVrL. L.
473, 476 (1989) (noting that in past, laws made allowances for pollution by coal
mining facilities because of their importance to industrialization); Melissa K. Scanlan, Vital Signs 1995: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future by Lester Brown et al., 23
ECOLOGY L.Q. 187, 189 (1996) (book review) ("[F]ossil-fuel based industrialization
continues in developing nations, and consumption in industrialized countries continues virtually unabated.").
3. See Richard A. Vassallo, Note, Administrative Law-Interpreting 30 U.S.C.
§ 902(W(2): What Are the "Criteria"of the Black Lung Amendment of 19777, 10 W. NEW
ENG. L. REv. 359, 360 (1988) (noting growth of lung disease problems associated
with coal dust after mechanization of mining equipment). The English, as early as
1661, also recognized that there were health problems associated with working in
mines. See id. at 359-60 n.6 (noting one 17th century commentator's view that coal
mining quickly destroyed miner and slowly destroyed those living near mine where
coal was excavated). The actual cause of the sickness in miners, however, was not
discovered until the mid 1800s. See id. at 360 n.7 (explaining that physicians in
1833 were first to posit that dust inhalation was cause of disease).
4. See N. LeRoy Lapp, A Lawyer's Medical Guide to Black Lung Litigation, 83 W.
VA. L. REv. 721, 723-24 (1981) (commenting on development of theories, beginning in 1936, on how coal dust might affect coal miners' lungs). See generally
CHARLES DICKENS, HARD TIMES (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971) (1854)
(exploring life of workers in generic English industrial town in mid-1 800s).
Coal dust harms miners' lungs by causing scarring that leads to fibrosis. See
ROBBINS PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE 707-08 (Ramzi S. Cotran et al. eds., 5th ed.

1995) (summarizing morphology of disease). Almost everyone that lives in a city
today inhales enough carbon dust to produce some scarring, but not on the same
level as the scarring that miners encountered in the past. See id. at 707 (noting that
complex coal workers' pneumoconiosis is most severe form of this type of fibrosis).

(1023)
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coal dust, produced by the mining process, on the workers' lungs. 5 Prolonged exposure, to coal dust can result in the development of pneumoconiosis, or black lung disease. 6 Although Congress has acted several
times to amend the rules, qualifications and procedures for reviewing de7
nials of benefits under the federal Black Lung Benefits Act (the "Act"),
there are still unresolved issues about how the circuits will resolve claims
8
denied by an administrative law judge ("ALJ").
5. SeeJonathan P. Nase, The Surprising Cost of Benefits: The Legislative History of
the Federal Black Lung Benefits Program, 4 J. MIN. L. & PoL'Y 277, 280 (1988) (explaining that 1969 Act by Congress was classic example of American system waiting
for catastrophe to occur before proffering remedies).
6. See Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 138 (1987) (noting that pneumoconiosis is commonly referred to as black lung disease, at least in coal mining context); Timothy F. Cogan,
Is the Doctor Hostile? Obstructive Impairments and the Hostility Rule in FederalBlack Lung
Claims, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 1003, 1008 (1995) (characterizing latest legal definition
of pneumoconiosis as confusing based on fact that silicosis is included within its
definition); see also Lapp, supra note 4, at 722-23 (discussing development of theory
that coal dust alone produces pneumoconiosis, even in absence of silica).
7. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1986 & Supp. 1998). The current version of the
Black Lung Benefits Act (the "Act") results from three previous congressional attempts to provide a remedy to black lung sufferers. In 1969, Congress enacted
Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act; Pub. L. No. 91-173, 82
Stat. 792 (1969). Three years later, Congress amended the Act in the Black Lung
Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 153 (1972), and amended it again
in 1977 in the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat.
95 (1978). The most recent congressional statement appears in the Black Lung
Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1635 (1981), representing the current form of the statute. For the purposes of this Casebrief, these congressional enactments, combined with the relevant administrative agency
regulations, will be referred to as the Black Lung Benefits Program (the
"Program").
8. See Allen R. Prunty & Mark E. Solomons, The FederalBlack Lung Program: Its
Evolution and Current Issues, 91 W. VA. L. REv. 665, 672 (1989) (explaining that
there are still unresolved issues even after years of changes in laws and regulations). According to one authority:
The federal black lung program is the result of an evolutionary process
that began in 1969 and continued through congressional amendments in
1972, 1977, and 1981. The history of the program is one of repeated liberalization of the entitlement criteria, with the deliberate purpose of
awarding more and more claims, until the program was tightened by [the
Department of Labor's ("DOL")]'s adoption of permanent entitlement
regulations in 1980 and congressional adoption of the 1981 amendments.
Id.; see Rita A. Massie, Note, Modification of Benefits for Claimants Under the Federal
Black Lung Benefits Program,97 W. VA. L. REV. 1023, 1023 (1995) (noting that progressive nature of disease is one reason initially denied claimants may reapply for
benefits and appeal decisions). The complexity of the process is also apparent
from the four revisions of the statute, two government agencies and three sets of
regulations that govern the process. See id. at 1024-25 (referring to Act, including
its four versions since 1969, governance by Department of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") (formerly Department of Health, Education and Welfare
("HEW")) and Social Security Administration ("SSA") and citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 410,
718 and 727 (1994)).
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This Casebrief focuses on two aspects of the black lung appeals process that the practitioner may encounter: (1) how a denial of benefits may
be appealed and (2) how the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit deals with the claims that come before it. Although there is much
data on this subject in the legal media, there is not much information that
specifically focuses on the Third Circuit's case law.9 Specifically, Part II of
this Casebrief discusses the statutory background for black lung claims and
the appeals process.' 0 Part III explains the case law that has developed
over the past eight to ten years and which was most recently addressed
again by the Third Circuit." Part III also provides an examination of the
policy considerations that have affected the courts' and legislature's decisionmaking process. 12 Finally, in Part IV, this Casebrief provides recom3
mendations to practitioners in the Third Circuit trying black lung cases.'
II.

BACKGROUND OF STATUTORY LAW AND APPEALS PROCESS

The Black Lung Benefits Program (the "Program") is an example of a
well-intentioned but poorly orchestrated attempt by the federal govern14
ment to address the needs of a class of citizens that has suffered injury.
The original act, formulated in 1969 and intended to replace inadequate
state workers' compensation programs, has undergone significant revision. 15 While some argue that the Program is a classic case of a govern9. See generally PENNSYLVANIA BAR INSTITUTE, BLACK LUNG BENEFITS PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE UPDATE (1983) (discussing processing of black lung benefits claims

from several different viewpoints). Most of the law review literature on the subject,
quite predictably as a result of geological history, comes from West Virginia. See,
e.g., Cogan, supra note 6, at 1010-20 (discussing physicians' role); Prunty & Solomons, supra note 8, at 672-84 (discussing evolution of program); Massie, supra note
8, at 1037-42 (describing process to obtain modification of benefits).
10. For a discussion of the statutory background and the appeals process, see
infra notes 14-117 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of Third Circuit jurisprudence dealing with black lung
claims, see infra notes 118-51 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the relevant policy considerations bearing on the
courts' and legislature's decisions, see infra notes 118-23, 148-51 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of recommendations for Third Circuit practitioners, see
infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
14. See Nase, supra note 5, at 280-81 (studying why costs of program significantly surpassed original estimates and concluding that Congress' seemingly erratic history of adding to statute was essentially effort to monitor program and
learn from experience). Even though many members of Congress were hesitant to
federalize what was seen as a workers' compensation law, the law passed. See id. at
281-82 (noting that although some lawmakers saw law as workers' compensation,
both Nixon and other supporters of bill denied that assertion).
Even today, the DOL is still attempting to combine the goals of the program
with its efficient administration. See Labor Department Proposes Changing Rules GoverningBlack Lung Benefits, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA),Jan. 22, 1997, at D-16 (describing
proposed changes).
15. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1986 & Supp. 1998) (instituting program
through Black Lung Benefits Act ("1969 Act")); H.R. REP. No. 91-563, pt. 1, at 13,
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ment program spiraling out of control, others contend that it has yet to
fulfill its original goal of aiding workers who were disabled as a result of
black lung disease and the spouses that survive them. 16 In any event, the
Program has now cost billions of dollars and resulted in over a million
17
claims filed.
Due to the complex statutory history of the Act, this background section will first address the historical development of the statutory law. 18
Second, it will present a detailed outline of the Third Circuit's most recent
decision on black lung benefits. 19 Third, it will outline several important
Third'Circuit cases on black lung disease that have been decided over the
past decade. 20 Finally, this section will both survey the role that Supreme
Court jurisprudence has played in the development of the law and discuss
21
the law in other circuits.
A.

Statutory Overview

Although the medical definition of pneumoconiosis seems simple,
the process of determining whether the definition is met to obtain benefits is complex. 2 2 In part, this complexity arises from the difficulty in provreprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2503, 2516 ("One of the compelling reasons ... was
the failure of the States to assume compensation responsibilities for the miners
covered by this program."); Prunty & Solomons, supra note 8, at 666-72 (detailing
reasons why program has had to be revised and concluding that incompatible expectations of groups involved play large role in controversy over program).
16. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 8, at 667-68 (arguing that view of program rests largely on what side one comes from, industry or worker). It seems that
there was no actual study of the relationship between pneumoconiosis and state
worker compensation law before the 1969 Act was promulgated. See id. ("'[N]ot a
single serious study of workers' compensation and pneumoconiosis had been undertaken by 1969. As a result, while the widely accepted notion that the system was
not working may have been true, it was not documented at all.'" (quoting P.
BARTH, THE TRAGEDY OF BLACK LUNG: FEDERAL COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL

DISEASE 280 (1987))). Instead, many members of Congress pushed the program as
a way to compensate justly victims of the disease who were now suffering the effects
of economic depression. See id. at 668 (explaining how different interest groups
viewed benefits program).
17. See Nase, supra note 5, at 279 (noting enormous and unanticipated costs
of program, but also allowing that program presents complex procedural
problems that Congress and DOL have continued to deal with over years); Prunty
& Solomons, supra note 8, at 666 (detailing costs of program).
18. For a further discussion of the historical development of the statutory law,
see infra notes 22-37 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the Mancia decision, see infra notes 38-60 and
accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of recent Third Circuit case law in this area, see
infra notes 61-99 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of other circuits' and Supreme Court case law, see
infra notes 100-17 and accompanying text.
22. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1224 (William R. Hensyl et al. eds.,
25th ed. 1990) (defining pneumoconiosis as "inflammation commonly leading to
fibrosis [hardening] of the lungs caused by the inhalation of dust incident to various occupations; characterized by pain in the chest ...fatigue after slight exertion;
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ing that a worker has black lung disease, which manifests itself slowly over
time. 2 3 It is also a result of both Congress' failure to set up a clear benefits
program in 1969 and the mining industry's efforts to reduce the amount
of their financial liability to former employees. 24 The difficulties encountered in the process created a backlog that is especially troublesome in
light of the fact that the miners were dying from the disease more quickly
than appeals of claim denials could be processed. 25 Since a 1981 legislative overhaul that followed several major revisions attempting to remedy
degree of disability depends on the type of particles inhaled, as well as the level of
exposure to them"); Massie, supra note 8, at 1024-25 (illustrating complexity by
noting that program is administered through two federal agencies, four statutes
and three sets of regulations); see also Lango v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 104 F.3d 573, 575 (3d Cir. 1997) (detailing case that took 14
years to come before Third Circuit); Smakula v. Weinberger, 572 F.2d 127, 131 (3d
Cir. 1978) (demonstrating confusion in awarding surviving spouse benefits where
death certificate was interpreted differently by administrative law judge ("ALJ")
and appeals council due to sparse information commonly included in death certificate); HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 174-77 (KurtJ. Isselbacher et
al. eds., 13th ed. 1994) (noting that pneumoconiosis can be cause of dyspnea,
which is "[an] abnormally uncomfortable awareness of breathing"); ROBBINS PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE, supra note 4, at 706-08 (characterizing coal worker's
pneumoconiosis resulting in fibrosis of lung as one of most serious types of pneumoconiosis and noting that development of disease was dependent on amount of
dust retained in airways and possible cumulative effects of smoking and other environmental irritants).
23. See Lapp, supra note 4, at 736 (noting that pneumoconiosis develops in

coal workers "silently over the course of many years"); see also ROBBINS PATHOLOGIC
BASIS OF DISEASE, supra note 4, at 706 (explaining that severity and development of
disease depends on variety of factors, such as "(1) the amount of dust retained in
lungs and airways; (2) the size, shape, and therefore buoyancy of the particles; (3)
particle solubility and physiochemical reactivity; and (4) the possible additional
effects of other irritants"). Specifically, it is rare for evidence of pneumoconiosis to
appear in the early stages of the disease because symptoms do not appear unless
the worker develops more complicated pneumoconiosis that affects lung function,
which takes many years to develop. See id. at 707-08.
24. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 8, at 667-69 (addressing Congress' failure to do its homework before creating original act and coal industry's subsequent
reluctance to pay for government social program). But see Nase, supra note 5, at
280 (reasoning that at least Congress monitored program and made changes as
"[it] learned from experience").
25. See Nase, supra note 5, at 316 (explaining that Congress has taken action
to correct " ' deplorable'" situation (quoting Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor
Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong. 20 (1986) (statement of Congressman Austin Murphy))). Due to the backlog of cases during the
1980s, Congress appropriated more funds to help the DOL process claims more
quickly. See id. at 316-17 (noting that Congress authorized borrowing ALJs from
other agencies and appropriated money to hire new ALJs and support personnel).
In addition, Congress also "encouraged the development of new procedures to
combat delay" and increased the size of the Benefits Review Board. Id. at 317.
The courts have also noted the problems that backlogs have caused over the
years. See, e.g., Lango, 104 F.3d at 575 (criticizing 14-year delay between initial filing and hearing); Keating v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
71 F.3d 1118, 1120 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting 17-year lapse before ALJ and Board
treated claim).
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these problems, Congress and the Department of Labor ("DOL") have
26
made only relatively minor changes, allowing ALJs to develop the law.
Nevertheless, Congress and the agencies that carry out the benefits pro27
gram have kept a keen eye on the situation.
The Act requires that claimants prove three things: (1) that they have
pneumoconiosis; (2) that the disease was caused by exposure to coal dust
encountered in the course of employment; and (3) that they are totally
disabled as a result of the disease. 28 To file a claim for benefits initially,
applicants must go to the Social Security Administration ("SSA") or DOL
office in their state. 29 If benefits are denied to claimants, they may appeal

26. See William S. Mattingly & Martin E. Hall, FederalBlack Lung Update: The
Standard of Disability Causationfor FederalBlack Lung Benefits, 94 W. VA. L. REv. 787,
787 (1992) (noting that whereas "practitioner litigating black lung claims once
relied upon [DOL's Review Board for guidance, now] the various [circuits and
Supreme Court] define legal standards by which black lung claims are tried");
Prunty & Solomons, supra note 8, at 671 (stating that "[s]ince 1981, most black
lung battles have been waged in the courts").
In most decisions, the party opposing the claimant is "Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs." This refers to the Director of the Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs ("OWCP"), an office within the DOL. For ease
of reading and to minimize confusion, the term DOL will be used to signify both
the Department of Labor and the Director of the OWCP. See Department of Labor
(visited March 15, 1998) <http://gatekeeper.dol.gov/dol/> (outlining structure of
DOL and OWCP).
27. See Labor DepartmentProposes ChangingRegulations Governing Black Lung Benefits, O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), Jan. 29, 1997, at 1213 (demonstrating that DOL is still
tinkering with rules and regulations affecting Program); see also ESA Proposed Rule
(visited Mar. 16, 1998) <http://gatekeeper.dol.gov/dol/esa/public/regs/fedreg/
proposed/97_12324.htm> (extending public comment on proposed changes to
DOL regulations).
28. See Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 126 (1988) (explaining
requirements of Act under interim presumptions); Cogan, supra note 6, at 1006
(describing test for pneumoconiosis, while also noting how several agencies and
several congressional acts have complicated entire procedure).
29. See Massie, supra note 8, at 1031 (stating where claimant should first file
his or her claim). As a side note, the fact that two agencies initially had responsibility for administering the program caused problems. See Prunty & Solomons,
supra note 8, at 670 (stating that while SSA saw this as disability program, DOL saw
its role as establisher of fair system to decide claims). Eventually, the SSA changed
its view, deciding that its role was simply to process claims. See id. (stating that "SSA

finally came to appreciate the fact that its job was simply to approve claims").
Where the claimant files his or her claim will depend on when the claim was
brought. See Massie, supra note 8, at 1025 n.7 (pointing out that claims brought
before July 1, 1973, were processed by SSA and paid for by federal government,
while claims brought after that date are processed by DOL and paid for by employers and trust fund). In addition, how the claims are handled and judged will depend upon when they were filed in relation to a number of interim presumptions
and permanent criteria established by the DOL. See id. (describing process of
applying interim presumptions) (citing Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 138 (1987)).
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in turn to an ALJ, the Benefits Review Board ("Board"), their federal cir30
cuit court and finally the United States Supreme Court.
When they initially promulgated the laws and regulations governing
the black lung benefits programs, Congress and the agencies decided that
3
certain coal mine workers should be presumed to have pneumoconiosis. A
30. See Massie, supra note 8, at 1030-36 (summarizing benefits claim and appeals process). Turning to the actual procedure for applying for benefits, the
claimant must first file a claim with the SSA or DOL office in his or her state. See
id. at 1031 (describing how claims process is initiated); see also Longshore Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 919, 939, 940 (1994) (governing claims procedure); 20 C.F.R.
§ 725.101(11) (1998) ("'District Director' means a person appointed as provided
in sections 39 and 40 of the Longshoremen and Harbour Workers' Compensation
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994), or his or her designee, who is authorized to
develop and adjudicate claims as provided in this subchapter."). A deputy director
of the DOL handles the claim, orders medical tests and makes an initial determination of whether the claimant is qualified to receive benefits. See Massie, supra
note 8, at 1032 (discussing DOL deputy director's responsibilities in processing
claims) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.405(b), 725.412(a)-(b) (1994)). If the application
is approved, the claimant's employer may either pay benefits or appeal. See id. ("If
the evidence supports an initial finding of eligibility, and it has been determined
that a coal mine operator may be liable for the claim, the deputy commissioner
shall proceed. ... If no operator can be identified, the deputy commissioner shall
proceed.") (citing 20 C.F.R. § 725.410(b) (1994)). If the claimant is denied benefits, he or she may appeal to an ALJ after both parties have held informal conferences to try to settle the matter. See id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.410(c),
725.413(b) (2), 725.415, 725.416 (1994)).
There are strict time limitations for the appeal that, if ignored, may disallow a
future claim. See id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 725.409 (1994)). But see 20 C.F.R.
§ 725.310 (1994) (allowing request for modification if filed within first year after
denial); 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(c) (1994) (allowing duplicate claim to be filed if "material change in conditions" has occurred).
Generally, the ALJ will examine the record and render a decision. See 20
C.F.R. § 725.477 (1998) (specifying form and content of decisions). In some cases,
the ALJ may remand the case to the deputy director if new issues, such as a change
in condition, have occurred. See Massie, supra note 8, at 1033 (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 725.463(b) (1994)). If the claimant remains unsatisfied after this step and alleges specific legal or factual errors, he or she may appeal to the Benefits Review
Board ("Board"). See id. at 1033-34 n.60 (noting that Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 921(b) (1994), governs appeals to Board).
The Board will look to the "substantial evidence in the record" to see if the
finding was warranted. See id. at 1034 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 802.301 (1994)). If still
dissatisfied, the claimant can appeal to the United States court of appeals in the
jurisdiction where the injury occurred. See id. at 1035 (citing 20 C.F.R.
§§ 725.482(a), 802.410(a) (1994)). Finally, the applicant can petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court if the applicant is still left unsatisfied. See
id.
31. See Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, § 411(c)(1-3), 30
U.S.C. §§ 921, 924 (1986 & Supp. 1998) (noting presumptions in favor of claimant
if they had worked in coal mine for at least 10 years and proved pneumoconiosis
was present, if they had worked in coal mine for at least 10 years and died of
respiratory disease or if they showed they had complicated pneumoconiosis). Note
that while simple pneumoconiosis is relatively benign, long-term exposure to coal
dust can result in the disabling condition called complicated coal workers' pneumoconiosis, which is the disease that the acts are intended to address. See ROBBINS
PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE, supra note 4, at 474 (teaching that simple pneumo-
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Because of concern that not enough claims were being approved, later
laws and regulations further liberalized the presumptions available to coal
mine workers. 3 2 After several years, however, the momentum had shifted
the other way so that most presumptions have been eliminated. 33
The "modification" of an award decision presents a separate issue and
can be instituted only through a deputy director of the DOL up to one
year after the initial decision. 3 4 A modification is only available in certain
coniosis is sometimes precursor to later, complicated type that can cause fibrosis,
or hardening of lungs). The first two of these three presumptions can be rebutted
with adequate evidence to the contrary. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 8, at

675 (citing 30 U.S.C. §§ 921, 924).
32. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 8, at 678 n.62 (characterizing language
in 20 C.F.R. § 410.490 as providing that x-rays, biopsy or autopsy, coupled with
either 10 years of coal mine work experience or proof that pneumoconiosis was
caused by employment, would invoke presumption) (citing Pittston Coal Group, 488
U.S. at 113-14). It is unclear whether these presumptions, enacted in 1972 for SSA
claims analysis, were or are rebuttable. See id. at 680 (noting that although it
seemed possible under law, it is unlikely that SSA ever intended to launch rebuttal
inquiry).
The DOL's low approval rate and huge backlog of cases encouraged Congress
to pass a new act in 1977. See id. at 681-82 (providing, in part, for "a presumption
of entitlement for the dependent survivors of miners who died prior to March 1,
1978... and had at least twenty-five years of coal mine employment before June
30, 1971") (citing Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239,
§ 3(a), 92 Stat. 96 (codified as amended in 30 U.S.C. § 921) (1986 & Supp. 1998)
[hereinafter 1977 Act]). The regulations regarding presumptions that were enacted in response to the 1977 Act are known as interim presumptions. See id. at
684 (citing 20 C.F.R. pt. 725 (1978)). For claims between 1978 and 1981, the presumption became less favorable to claimants, in general requiring more evidence.
See id. at 684-710 (discussing legislative changes that resulted in more difficult path
for claimants).
33. See id. at 710-13 (noting that most presumptions were eliminated by 1981
Act, in part because trust fund was in debt and nondisabled miners were receiving
benefits). The presumptions in effect after 1981 included a presumption of entitlement if the claimant proved complicated pneumoconiosis. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 718.304 (1998) (evidencing that present-day irrebuttable presumptions are limited to certain medical diagnoses). Of course, these presumptions have been the
subject of much judicial interpretation. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 8, at
713 n.265 (rejecting "situs of coal" test) (citing Stroh v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 810 F.2d 61, 64 (3d Cir. 1987)); see also Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Ziegler Coal Co., 853 F.2d 529, 533
(7th Cir. 1988) (choosing neither to accept nor reject test); Collins v. Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 795 F.2d 368, 372 n.5 (4th Cir. 1986)
(same).
34. See Massie, supra note 8, at 1037 n.73 (defining modification in this context as meaning reconsideration of terms of award). A modification claim is
presented or instituted only through a deputy director of the DOL. See id. at 1038
(noting process that is followed to institute modification procedure). But see id. at
1039 (stressing that Board has decided that director's role in modification is limited to transferring petition to ALJ) (citing Yates v. Armco Steel Corp., 10 B.L.R. 1132 (1987)). In general, though, the applicant goes through the same steps as in
the normal application and appeals process. See id. at 1040 (noting that modification claims process in ALJ, Board and circuit court is similar to regular process, but
director has power to correct mistake of fact or change in condition).
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instances: (1) if a mistake of fact is discovered or (2) if the claimant's
physical condition changes so that he or she is totally disabled. 35 After the
one year period following the initial decision, a worker can file a "duplicate claim" to which new rules apply. 36 For the coal mine worker to have
his or her claim readjudicated after the first year, the worker needs evidence of a material change in condition from the point at which the ALJ
decides that the disease presented itself at the time of the first application
or evidence that the disease progressed to the point of being totally
37
disabling.
B. Most Recent Third CircuitDecision:
Mancia v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
In the latest black lung case in the Third Circuit, Mancia v. Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,38 the original claimant, Angelo
Mancia, died while sitting in his car without the engine running. 39 The
main issue before the court was whether his heart stopped due to a myocardial infarction, commonly called a heart attack, or cardiopulmonary
arrest, in which the heart stops because it is not receiving enough oxygen. 40 If cardiopulmonary arrest caused the death, then it could be linked
35. See id. at 1040-42 (outlining requirements to receive modification of
award, but noting that some circuits have limited powers of deputy directors).
Note that while a modification due to a mistake of fact provides for benefits that
are retroactive to the initial hearing, a modification because of a change in condition only provides for benefits from that date of change in condition. See id. at
1042 (explaining distinction) (citingJarka Corp. v. Hughes, 299 F.2d 534, 536-37
(2d Cir. 1962)).
36. See id. at 1042-43 (noting difference between duplicate and modified
claims); see also 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(c)-(d) (1998) (explaining that modifications
and duplicate claims are treated differently, with modifications often more advantageous to claimant).
37. See Massie, supra note 8, at 1043-46 (noting that although claims and appeals procedure remains same for modifications, modifications may be more advantageous to claimant because claimant eligibility criteria will be determined by
original filing date-i.e., more liberal interim presumptions may be available). Deciding what a material change in condition means has been the subject of a dispute among several circuits and commentators. For a further discussion of this
dispute, see infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
38. 130 F.3d 579 (3d Cir. 1997).
39. See id. at 581 (explaining that engine was not running, which helps to rule
out any suggestion of suicide). Mr. Mancia worked in the coal mines for eight
years and was awarded benefits during his lifetime, after appealing to an ALJ, because of his total disability. See id. at 580. Because the test for survivor's benefits is
different than that for a living, disabled miner to receive benefits, Mrs. Mancia was
forced to reapply for benefits. See id. at 585.
40. See id. at 582-84 (describing evidence available and ALJ's finding of fact
that death was not due to pneumoconiosis). The physcian who signed the death
certificate, Dr. Manganiello, was Mr. Mancia's treating physcian. See id. at 581. Dr.
Manganiello later testified that "' [n]o where [sic] in my death certificate or in my
opinions do I feel that I have ever expressed a myocardial infarction as his cause of
death.'" Id. at 582.
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to his black lung disease and Mrs. Mancia, the widow, would be able to
41
collect survivor's benefits.
After a lengthy examination of the evidence, the ALJ ruled in the
DOL's favor, and the Board affirmed the decision. 42 The Third Circuit,
however, reversed the findings of the ALJ and the Board and ruled in
favor of awarding benefits to the surviving widow. 4 3 Interestingly, the
court noted that only after the 1981 amendments to the Act did a surviv44
ing spouse have to prove the decedent died from black lung disease.
Before those amendments were adopted, the only requirement was that
the decedent was receiving benefits at the time of death. 45 According to
the post-1981 test though, Mrs. Mancia had to prove by a preponderance
46
of the evidence that pneumoconiosis hastened her husband's death.
.41. See id. at 584-85 (noting that test to receive benefits was whether Mrs.
Mancia could show, by preponderance of evidence, that spouse's death was hastened by pneumoconiosis). Specifically, note that benefits were available to Mrs.
Mancia, under the DOL regulations, because she was an "eligible survivor[ ] of a
miner whose death was due to pneumoconiosis." See 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(a)
(1998).
42. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 583-84 (outlining ALJ's decision and Board's affirmance). The ALJ had two main difficulties with Mrs. Mancia's evidence: (1)
there were statements from Dr. Manganiello that Mr. Mancia had suffered from
cor pulmonae and (2) there was a note from the physician noting the cause of
death as acute myocardial infarction. See id. (discussing reasons claim was denied). Cor pulmonae is a form of pulmonary heart disease that has no necessary
tie to exposure to coal dust. See ROBBINS PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE, supra note
4, at 542-43 (noting that term is synonym for pulmonary hypertensive heart
disease).
Although the physician rejected both the testimony and letter, the ALJ found
that this evidence demonstrated that Dr. Manganiello "simply assumed that black
lung disease played a part in the miner's death." Mancia, 130 F.3d at 583-84.
43. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 593-94 (noting that "totality of the evidence does
not support the conclusion that Mancia suffered a heart attack"). Furthermore,
the court criticized the ALJ for requiring objective means to prove pneumoconiosis when the DOL had already conceded that fact. See id. at 593 (noting that according to DOL regulations, objective tests for pneumoconiosis can include x-rays,
pulmonary function and blood gas tests) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.202,
718.204(c) (1-2) (1998)).
44. See id. at 585 n.6 (explaining that before effective date of amendments,
which was January 1, 1982, Mrs. Mancia would have "been entitled to derivative
benefits based upon the benefits that had been awarded to [Mr. Mancia] during
his lifetime"). As it was, however, because of the 1981 amendments, she had to
prove that her husband's death was caused by pneumoconiosis. See id. For a further discussion of those amendments, see Pothering v. Parkson Coal Co., 861 F.2d
1321, 1322-31 (3d Cir. 1988) (discussing 1981 amendments to Act).
45. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 585 n.6 (noting pre-1982 regulations, which would
have allowed Mrs. Mancia to receive benefits without demonstrating that husband's death was caused by pneumoconiosis). For a further discussion of the pre/
post-1981 amendments in this context, see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
46. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 585 (noting that Mrs. Mancia must prove "that her
husband's death was hastened by pneumoconiosis"); 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c) (2)
(1998) (explaining that survivor could receive benefits "[w]here pneumoconiosis
was a substantially contributing cause or factor leading to the miner's death or
where the death was caused by complications of pneumoconiosis").
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One important reason why the ALJ denied the claim was that the ALJ
believed that the death certificate indicated a heart attack as the cause of
death, but the Third Circuit took a different view of the testimony of the
physician who signed the death certificate. 47 Relying on its own precedent, the court noted that it was common practice to note such things as
"'coronary occlusion"' on a death certificate and that the mention of this
inherently unreliable cause of death would not serve as substantial evidence that the miner died of heart disease. 48 In addition, as in a past case,
the court relied on the lay testimony of the decedent's widow and brother
to establish his increasing breathing problems leading up to the time of
49
death.
The court also concluded that the ALJ erred in treating an admittedly
inadequate medical explanation as simply an assumption. 50 In other
words, the court decided that the ALJ required "too much" medical certainty. 5 1 The court asserted that the ALJ ignored the fact that much of
47. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 582, 587 (noting that physician who signed death
certificate listing cause of death as cardiopulmonary arrest meant that heart
stopped as result of underlying lung problem caused by anthrasilicosis). The court
noted that the statutory definition of pneumoconiosis includes anthrasilicosis. See
id. at 581 n.3 (discussing broadness of legal definition as compared to medical
definition) (citing Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 312 (3d Cir.
1996)).
48. See id. at 586-87 (discussing past cases and finding that holdings are helpful in determining probative value of death certificate versus signing physician's
testimony regarding cause of death); Hillibush v. United States Dep't of Labor, 853
F.2d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[A] death certificate listing 'coronary occlusion'
and [not] listing any other contributing conditions [does not rule out] widow's
entitlement to survivor's benefits."); Smakula v. Weinberger, 572 F.2d 127, 132 (3d
Cir. 1978) (noting that merely listing "coronary occlusion" as cause of death on
death certificates is common).
49. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 587-88 (explaining that even with current restrictive regulations, ALJ cannot ignore lay testimony); Hillibush, 853 F.2d at 204-05
(considering all relevant evidence even in face of death certificate's conclusion).
The lay testimony here consisted of Mrs. Mancia's comments that her husband had
complained of breathing problems during the previous week and that he turned
white when experiencing shortness of breath. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 587. In addition, Mr. Mancia's brother noted Mr. Mancia's inability to engage in any physical
activity. See id. These statements are consistent with what happens to persons with
this disease, because their lungs become so scarred and hardened that air exchange eventually becomes impossible. See ROBBINS PATHOLOGIC BAsis OF DISEASE,
SUpra note 4, at 706-08 (noting that when complicated pneumoconiosis develops,

pulmonary dysfunction increases).
50. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 588-89 (explaining that physician's "assumption"
was in fact based on knowledge of decedent's ongoing lung problem); Plesh v.
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 71 F.3d 103, 107 n.8 (3d
Cir. 1995) (noting that reasoned medical judgments are to be accepted as evidence); Risher v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 940 F.2d
327, 330 (8th Cir. 1991) (concluding that opinion of physician constituted sufficient medical evidence); Peabody Coal Co. v. Helms, 859 F.2d 486, 490 (7th Cir.
1988) (requiring only reasoned medical judgment); Drummond Coal Co. v. Freeman, 733 F.2d 1523, 1526 (11th Cir. 1984) (same).
51. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 589 (noting that assumptions are not inconsistent
with reasoned medical judgments) (citing Director, Office of Workers' Compensa-
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medical decisionmaking is based on instinct, developed through years of
practice. 52 The court distinguished this case from Lango v. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs,5 3 in which the doctor's statements were

54
completely conclusory and could truly be termed an assumption.
Although the Mancia court acknowledged that it will consider a nontreating physician's statements, it concluded that the DOL expert's testimony was not sufficient here. 55 Pointedly, the nontreating physician was
the DOL's only witness.5 6 The court found that his testimony was contra57
dicted by reports from at least two physicians who examined Mr. Mancia.
In concluding that the widow deserved survivor's benefits, the court
found that there was not enough evidence to support the ALJ's rejection
of the treating physician's testimony that black lung disease hastened Mr.
Mancia's death.5 8 In fact, the court went so far as to direct an award for
damages immediately, based on its past decisions to do so when the "result
is foreordained." 59 Although the court stressed that awarding benefits

tion Programs v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1327 (3d Cir. 1987); Brazzalle v. Direc-

tor, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 803 F.2d 934, 936 (8th Cir.
1986)).
52. See id. (explaining value of physician's medical judgment); Mangifest, 826
F.2d at 1327 ("[Mjedical judgment is sometimes based upon instinct .... "). As
one medical textbook stated, "This combination of medical knowledge, intuition,
and judgment is termed the art of medicine. It is as necessary to the practice of
medicine as a sound scientific base." See HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE, supra note 22, at 1.
53. 104 F.3d 573 (3d Cir. 1997)
54. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 590 (noting that in this case, physician presented
testimony that explained his reasoning). But see Lango, 104 F.3d at 576 (demonstrafing that claimant offered no testimony from treating physician to show that
pneumoconiosis hastened survivor's husband's death).
55. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 590-91 (explaining that court will consider nontreating physician's testimony in some cases); Evosevich v. Consolidation Coal Co.,
789 F.2d 1021, 1028 (3d Cir. 1986) (utilizing nontreating physician's testimony
where it corroborated opinion of treating physician).
56. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 590 (noting that "Dr. Candor's report is the only
medical conclusion consistent with the ALJ's finding that Mancia'a death was not
caused by complications related to his black lung disease").
57. See id. at 592 (describing weakness of DOL's case). One other physician,
Dr. E.J. Biancarelli, had conducted a physical examination of Mr. Mancia. See id.
(demonstrating that exam showed evidence of pneumoconiosis). In addition,
although Dr. Candor mentioned several other x-rays that showed no evidence of
the disease, he did not rely on these in his testimony. See id. Importantly, Dr.
Biancarelli stated that there was at least one x-ray that showed pneumoconiosis. See
id.
58. See id. at 593 (holding for claimant and relying on analysis of Dr. Manganiello's testimony and lack of support for ALJ's finding). The court also stated
that in cases such as this, where there was enough evidence to render a decision, it
would not require an autopsy to be performed. See id. (suggesting that some other
cases may require autopsy).
59. See id. at 593-94 (noting that widow had met burden and Director's evidence was inconsistent with decedent's medical history). This ruling was based not
only on past case law, but also on federal regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(d)
(1997) (noting that survivor will receive benefits if evidence shows that miner's
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without remand will not be appropriate in every case, it concluded that
60
this was the best choice here.

C.

Other Third Circuit Decisions

The Third Circuit has heard many appeals involving black lung cases
as a result of the vast amounts of anthracite coal found in Pennsylvania
and the numerous mining operations engaged in its extraction. 61 A brief
introduction to some of the cases decided in the past decade will help the
reader or practitioner understand the analysis of the Third Circuit's ap62
proach to black lung benefits cases.
In one recent case, Penn Allegheny Coal Co. v. Williams,63 the court decided that the DOL's regulations that establish four methods to demonstrate that pneumoconiosis exists should be considered "in their
totality." 64 The court decided that although the Board erred in considering only one part of the evidence, the radiological findings, the error was
harmless in light of the other evidence establishing that the respondent

death was due to pneumoconiosis and Director's evidence does not disprove this
assertion); see also Keating v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
71 F.3d 1118, 1123-25 (3d Cir. 1995) (choosing to award damages immediately,
without remand, where result is foreordained).
60. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 593-94 (describing widow's advanced age, length
of appeal and strength of case as rationale for expediting award of benefits to
survivor); see also Kowalchick v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 893 F.2d 615, 624 (3d Cir. 1990) (awarding benefits immediately where
there could be only one conclusion).
61. For a further discussion of several Third Circuit cases, see infra notes 6399, supra notes 38-60 and accompanying text. A Westlaw search using the terms
"Black Lung" or "pneumoconiosis" resulted in over 100 records.
62. For a further discussion of several Third Circuit cases that will help the
practitioner to obtain an overall picture of the Third Circuit's jurisprudence, see
infra notes 63-99, supra notes 38-60 and accompanying text. In addition, there is a
web site that provides information on new and important case law in each circuit.
See Federal Black Lung Benefits Clinic (visited Sept. 21, 1998) <http://iberty.uc.wlu.
edu/-coalmine/>.
63. 114 F.3d 22 (3d Cir. 1997).
64. See id. at 25 (noting that although regulations propose four distinct methods of establishing black lung disease, ALJ should weigh all evidence together); 20
C.F.R. § 718.202(a) (1998) (enumerating four methods to establish existence of
pneumoconiosis: (1) x-rays; (2) biopsies or autopsies; (3) available presumptions;
and (4) physician diagnosis based on available tests). Because no disjunctive "or"
separates the provisions, the court agreed with the DOL that all aspects should be
considered together, finding that the Board committed an error in concluding
that the disease existed based solely on x-ray evidence. See Penn Allegheny, 114 F.3d
at 25 (concluding that Board should have looked at all available evidence).
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had pneumoconiosis. 65 Therefore, the court denied the coal company's
66
petition to review the case.
In Lango, the court was confronted with a surviving spouse who petitioned the court after the Board had affirmed the ALJ's denial of benefits. 6 7 As in Mancia, the Board and ALJ had found that the widow had not
established that her husband's pneumoconiosis contributed to his
death. 68 In this case, however, the court upheld the denial of benefits
because of the lack of evidence proffered by the claimant. 69
Although there was a death certificate that listed the cause of death as
pneumoconiosis, the failure of Mr. Lango's physician to present an explanation of his reasoning fatally damaged Mrs. Lango's claim for survivor's
benefits. 70 Interestingly, in dicta, the Lango court criticized the DOL for
its careless handling of this and other black lung cases. 7 1 The court's
65. See Penn Allegheny, 114 F.3d at 25 (explaining that because ALJ had correctly considered doctor's reports, biopsies and x-rays, Board's error in upholding
finding of pneumoconiosis was harmless). In addition, the court agreed that it was
proper for the ALJ to give more credence to the two physicians who actually performed the biopsy on the claimant. See id. (explaining that this was within ALJ's
prerogative),
66. See id. at 24-26 (disagreeing with coal company's argument that Board
should have been precluded from considering x-ray evidence and that this fact
alone resulted in reversible error).
67. See Lango v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 104
F.3d 573, 574 (1997) (noting that sole issue on review was whether "there was
substantial evidence to support the decision reached by both the [Board] and the
ALJ that Mrs. Lango failed to establish that her husband's pneumoconiosis was a
contributing cause of his death"); 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c)(2) (1998) (explaining
that "[w] here pneumoconiosis was a substantially contributing cause or factor leading to the miner's death or where the death was caused by complications of pneumoconiosis," survivor could receive benefits).
68. See Lango, 104 F.3d at 574 (explaining that ALJ and Board failed to find
that widow established that her husband's death was due to pneumoconiosis). The
court also noted that it was an undisputed fact that Mr. Lango died of lung cancer.
See id. at 576. Somewhat surprisingly, this fact does not make it more or less likely
that his pneumoconiosis had contributed to his death. See ROBBINS PATHOLOGIC
BASIS OF DISFASE, supra note 4, at 476 (detailing findings that suggest, once cigarette smoking is factored out, that lung cancer is no more or less prevalent in
victims of black lung disease).
69. See Lango, 104 F.3d at 576 (adding that "only evidence introduced by the
claimant in an effort to show that [black lung disease hastened death] was his
death certificate"). The death certificate, prepared 14 years after the death of Mr.
Lango, listed black lung disease as a "significant condition contributing to death."
Id. Nevertheless, the court was perplexed by the claimant's failure to offer evidence by the physician who signed the certificate, Dr. DiNicola. See id. ("Inexplicably, at the 1995 hearing before the ALJ the claimant did not proffer any evidence
by Dr. DiNicola, who was still available to testify about the basis of his opinion.").
Without evidence of the medical reasoning behind the death report, the certificate
was not sufficiently probative to prove causation. See id. at 577-78 (noting that
claimant failed to meet required burden).
70. For a discussion of the problems with the death certificate evidence, see
supra note 69 and accompanying text.
71. See Lango, 104 F.3d at 575-76 (lamenting 14-year delay between filing and
initial hearing, but acknowledging that it could not award benefits solely on those
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opinion and the DOL's brief suggest that the widow may still have an opportunity to receive benefits if she applies for a modification and has Mr.
Lango's physician present evidence to support his conclusion concerning
72
the cause of death.
In yet another case where a surviving widow's claim for benefits was
denied, Keating v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,73 the
Third Circuit addressed the modification issue that it had touched on in
Lango.74 In discussing the seventeen-year lapse between her initial claim
and the ALJ's and Board's treatment of her claim, the court rejected the
75
suggestion that Mrs. Keating was "shopping for a friendly factfinder."
Importantly, the court also noted that the purpose of the statute required
construing the language liberally. 7 6 The court found not only that the
ALJ's initial ruling was incorrect, but also that a subsequent ALJ made an
error in not reconsidering new evidence pursuant to a modification request. 77 Finally, in a move similar to the Mancia court, this court decided
grounds); see also Nase, supra note 5, at 316 (explaining that General Accounting
Office report in 1980s estimated that, without increased funding, DOL's ALJs
would face backlog of cases that would result in even longer processing delays).
The most unconscionable aspect of these delays would be that claimants would die
of the very disease they were complaining about before their claims could be resolved. See id. at 317 (emphasizing practical problems with system).
72. See Lango, 104 F.3d at 578 (noting that timely appeal will allow DOL to
reconsider case). All Mrs. Lango would need is a more complete medical rationale
for the ALJ to consider. See id. (suggesting that widow procure testimony from Dr.
DiNicola).
73. 71 F.3d 1118 (3d Cir. 1995).
74. See id. at 1120 (discussing history of present claim and noting that claim
has been before three ALJs and three Boards); see also Lango, 104 F.3d at 578 (noting that surviving spouse has option of pursuing benefits under modification
clause). The court noted that in a modification situation, such as the one here,
benefits would be awarded back to the date of the miner's death or January 1,
1974, whichever is later. See Keating, 71 F.3d at 1120 n.2 (explaining survivor benefits clause in 20 C.F.R. § 725.503(c) (1995)). Therefore, after the court decided to
award Mrs. Keating survivor benefits, it pointed out that they would be retroactive
to July 1978. See id. at 1120 (awarding benefits beginning in first full month after
miner's death).
75. See Keating, 71 F.3d at 1120 (stating that "[i]t is not apparent from the
record whether she was shopping for a friendly factfinder or just a fair one"). The
court characterized this case as having "a shamefully long history." Id. In addition,
the court noted that "it is painfully obvious that she found neither [a fair factfinder
nor a friendly one]." Id.
76. See 30 U.S.C. § 901 (a) (1986 & Supp. 1998) (stating that purpose of statute is "to ensure that in the future adequate benefits are provided to coal miners
and their dependents [if death or disability was due to] pneumoconiosis"); Keating,
71 F.3d at 1122 (recognizing that remedial nature of statute requires broad interpretation); Kline v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 877 F.2d
1175, 1180 n.15 (3d Cir. 1989) (same).
77. See Keating,71 F.3d at 1122 (explaining that according to pre-1982 regulations, widow should have been allowed to have her claim considered solely on basis
of lay testimony where medical evidence was unavailable and 10-year presumption
was unavailable). In addition, the second ALJ to consider the case, under a modification provision, had erred when he refused to consider new evidence found in a
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to award benefits to the widow, remanding only so that the DOL could
78

carry out this order.
In Plesh v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,79 the court
80
reversed the ALJ's ruling terminating benefits of a retired coal miner.
In Plesh, a miner who had been receiving benefits for approximately seven
years received a letter from the DOL informing him that a review of his
file showed "'certain deficiencies"' and instructing Plesh, the miner, to
have testing done at DOL expense. 8 ' After the conclusion of the testing,
which demonstrated that Plesh was not totally disabled from pneumoconiosis, the DOL issued an "order to show cause" as to why the original award
should not be modified.8 2 In response to the letter, Plesh returned the
order, handwriting a note on the last page signifying his intention to ap83
peal and stressing that the benefits were his only means of support.
certificate that demonstrated the number of years that Mr. Keating had worked in
the coal mine. See id. at 1121-23 (analyzing ALJ's decision under applicable regulations). The third ALJ had erred when he did not consider whether the first ALJ
had erred when he did not consider the lay testimony. See id. (noting that third
ALJ erred "by refusing to render de novo factual findings based on the lay
evidence").
78. See id. at 1124-25 (following decisions in past cases awarding benefits without remand where result was foreordained); see, e.g., Kowalchick v. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs, 893 F.2d 615, 621, 624 (3d Cir. 1990) (deciding that directing benefits immediately was best course where result is
foreordained).
79. 71 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 1995).
80. See id. at 115 (remanding for purpose of reinstating benefits, which DOL
had erroneously terminated). Here, the court concluded that because the ALJ
had not rebutted the interim presumption available to the claimant, he was still
presumed to be disabled by pneumoconiosis. See id. at 114 (holding that physician's opinion was insufficient to rebut presumption); see also 20 C.F.R.
§ 727.203(a) (1978) (providing interim presumption for claimant).
81. See Plesh, 71 F.3d at 105 (establishing that radiologists who read chest xrays concluded they were negative for pneumoconiosis). The radiologists who
read the films were both "B-readers," which is a designation a physician may earn
after passing a test administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. See id. at 105 n.2 (providing for B-readers) (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 718.202(a)(ii)(E) (1995); 42 C.F.R. § 37.51 (1995)).
82. See id. at 105-06 (according to order, Mr. Plesh had 30 days to demonstrate why DOL should not terminate his benefits payments). To show cause, Mr.
Plesh would have had to prove that he was totally disabled from pneumoconiosis
caused by working 17 years in a coal mine. See id. at 106 (illustrating standard
demanded of Plesh).
83. See id. (noting that DOL never responded to letter and there was no official appeal filed by Plesh for some time). It is evident from the text of the letter
that Mr. Plesh believed that his note served as an appeal:

Dear Sir-I am appealingthis as of now. Having went to the Howard Hospital, for my Pulmonary Medical Records and I was told they were sent to
Mt. Sterling KY Labor Dept-and having taken another exam at Dr. Corrazza [the DOL physician] [sic]-Now I am going to get another exam
and will give you further med. evidence of my health for Black Lung after
26 years in coal mines. I will send this to you as soon as possible-thank
you ... P.S ....
this is the only means of survival that my wife and I have
to live on now-thank you.
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When Plesh finally submitted a formal claim for benefits two years later, it
was initially treated as a duplicate claim instead of a request for modification because Plesh had filed his second claim more than one year after the
first claim was denied. 84 In the end, the court reinstated his benefits, finding that the handwritten appeal had been valid and that the presumption
85
in favor of Plesh was not rebutted by substantial evidence.
In Labelle ProcessingCo. v. Swarrow,86 the main dispute was whether the
ALJ had used the correct standard in reviewing a new claim application
after rejecting a previous claim. 8 7 Swarrow's claim was denied twice, and
he was then precluded from submitting additional evidence because the
time for appeal had passed.88 After the claimant filed a duplicate claim,
the ALJ found that Swarrow had suffered a "'material change in conditions"' that made it necessary to award him benefits.8 9 While the Third
Circuit found that the ALJ had used the correct standard, its construction
has been the subject of much debate among the circuits. 90 Ultimately, the
Id. Instead of responding to this letter, the DOL entered a final order terminating
Plesh's benefits. See id.
84. See id. (explaining standard that DOL utilized in reviewing second claim).
Because the DOL used the more stringent duplicate claim test, Plesh appealed
again, and a second ALJ agreed with him that he should have the protection of the
original presumption in his favor. See id. (noting that this ALJ agreed that Plesh's
letter constituted valid appeal). Nevertheless, this ALJ found that a second physician's report rebutted that presumption. See id. at 107-08 (finding that interim
presumption under 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b) (3) was rebutted). The Third Circuit
reversed this finding, however, because it disagreed that the report constituted
substantial evidence that would rebut the presumption in favor of Plesh. See id. at
109, 114 (finding that party opposing benefits had not ruled out possible causal
connection between employment and disability, as required by precedent). Therefore, Plesh's benefits were reinstated. See id. at 114-15.
85. See id.
86. 72 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 1995).
87. See id. at 310 (deciding that ALJ had applied wrong standard in deciding
whether miner established material change in condition).
88. See id. at 311-12 (describing evidence submitted by DOL and Swarrow,
including conflicting reports from agency-qualified "B-readers" of chest x-rays).
The new evidence that was not admitted included testimony from two physicians
who concluded that Swarrow was now totally disabled from pneumoconiosis. See
id. at 311 n.4 (noting that this evidence demonstrated that Swarrow was totally
disabled).
89. See id. at 312 (noting that Board later affirmed ALJ's grant of benefits to
claimant). Although the court decided that the "material change in conditions"
standard was correct, the ALJ's application of the standard was problematic. See id.
at 316-18 (noting that error was in application, not choice of test).
90. See id. (analyzing debate among circuits over interpretation of correct
standard in duplicate claims situations). In interpreting the relevant provision,
one Board decided on a "reasonable possibility that it would change the prior
administrative result." Spese v. Peabody Coal Co., BRB No. 86-3316 BLA, 1988 WL
232660, at *2 (Dep't Lab. Benefits Rev. Bd. Sept. 30, 1988); see 20 C.F.R.
§ 725.309(c) (1998) (discussing merger, automatic denial and modification possibilities for duplicate claims depending on when original claim was entered). The
Seventh Circuit decided that the standard means that either the miner did not
have the disease upon first application, but subsequently developed it, or that the
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claim was remanded so that the ALJ could consider it under the correct
interpretation of'the standard. 9 1
In a final example of the often lengthy benefits adjudication process,
the Third Circuit reversed the Board's denial of benefits to a retired coal
miner in Kowalchick v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs.9 2 In
Kowalchick, the Third Circuit addressed which standard of review the
Board should have used in reviewing the ALJ's decision. 9 3 Here, the court
noted that it independently reviewed the record to decide if the ALJ's

finding was supported by substantial evidence. 94 According to the court,
the exact definition of substantial evidence is "'more than a mere scintilla'"-it meant that there is relevant evidence that a "'reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'

95

disease has progressed to disable the miner totally. See Labelle, 72 F.3d at 317 (noting that Seventh Circuit rejected Spese standard and suggested different standard)
(citing Sahara Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
946 F.2d 554, 556 (7th Cir. 1991)). The Seventh Circuit standard states that:
A material change in conditions means either that the miner did not have
black lung disease at the time of first application but has since contracted
it and become totally disabled by it, or that his disease has progressed to
the point of becoming totally disabling although it was not at the time of
the first application.
Sahara Coal, 946 F.2d at 556. The Fourth Circuit also adopted the Sahara Coal
formulation. See Lisa Lee Mines v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 57 F.3d 402, 407 (4th Cir. 1995) (adopting Sahara standard), reh'g en banc,
86 F.3d 1358 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1090 (1997). In contrast, the
Sixth Circuit and the Third Circuit have adopted the DOL's formulation, which is
that a miner must show that he or she can disprove an element that previously
denied him or her entitlement. See Labelle, 72 F.3d at 317 (adopting DOL formulation) (citing Sharondale v. Ross, 42 F.3d 993, 997-98 (6th Cir. 1994)).
91. See Labelle, 72 F.3d at 318 (remanding case to ALJ for determination of
whether benefits should be awarded). The main value that can be derived from
this case, however, is the test for "material change" in this context. See id. at 317
(discussing material change issue in some detail).
92. 893 F.2d 615, 616, 624 (3d Cir. 1990). The court reversed the denial of
benefits to the retired coal miner because interim presumptions were not rebutted, and the court also noted that it will construe the Act liberally. See id. at 624.
93. See id. at 619-20 (noting that "Board is bound by an ALJ's findings of fact if
they are supported by substantial evidence"). The ALJ had found that the interim
presumptions were rebutted and that, in fact, he was not even sure that the claimant was entitled to the presumptions. See id. at 619.
94. See id. (establishing that Board should defer to factual findings of ALJ if
supported by substantial evidence); see also Kertesz v. Crescent Hills Coal Co., 788
F.2d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The findings of fact made by the ALJ are conclusive
upon the [Board] if they are supported by substantial evidence."); Old Ben Coal
Co. v. Prewitt, 755 F.2d 588, 589-90 (7th Cir. 1985) (announcing court's role as
limited to deciding if Board made error in scope of review).
95. Kowalchick, 893 F.2d at 620 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971)).
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The court noted that despite its limited role in review, it would construe the black lung entitlement program liberally. 96 Although the DOL
argued that the court should remand the case to the ALJ, the claimant
argued that the medical evidence in the record established that he should
receive benefits. 97 Ultimately, the Kowalchick court relied on the "true
doubt" rule, which states that contradictory but equally probative evidence
shall be construed in favor of the claimant.9 8 Therefore, benefits were
awarded without remanding to the ALJ. 9 9
D.

United States Supreme Court Decisions

Familiarity with the Supreme Court jurisprudence on this topic, including the issues addressed and its holdings, is beneficial to an analysis of
Third Circuit case law. Accordingly, significant Court decisions on this
issue are set forth below. 100 In Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs,'0 ' the Court confronted the most complex compo-

nent of the claims and appeals process: claims are subject to different regulations depending on which set of regulations was in effect when the
claim was initially brought. 10 2 In this case, the Court agreed with the
DOL's reading of one regulation, deciding that the "preponderance of the
evidence test" was correct for determining whether the claimant should be
granted an interim presumption in his or her favor.' 0 3 In contrast, the
Court characterized the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit's less exacting test in granting a presumption in the claimant's
96. See id. (noting that court was mindful of how to construe act); see also
Bozwich v. Mathews, 558 F.2d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that legislative history of program suggested liberal analysis in favor of claimants).
97. See Kowalchick, 893 F.2d at 620-21 (analyzing evidence on both sides and
deciding that evidence is about equal).
98. See id. at 621-22 (relying in part on true doubt rule). This rule was later
cast aside by the United States Supreme Court in Director,Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1994). For a further

discussion of the true doubt rule, see infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
99. See Kowalchick, 893 F.2d at 624 (invoking "result is foreordained" test that
allows court to award benefits immediately, without remand). Here, the court decided that the record only supported one conclusion-an award of benefits to the
claimant. See id. (noting that no purpose would be served by remand).
100. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court cases, see infra notes 10117 and accompanying text.
101. 484 U.S. 135 (1987).
102. See id. at 138 (illustrating that "[blecause [the Act] has been developed
through several statutory enactments, different rules govern claims filed during
different periods of time") (footnote omitted). Here, the interim regulations for
claims filed prior to 1980 are invoked and discussed. See id. at 139.
103. See id. at 152, 159-60 (agreeing with Secretary of Labor's view that claimant must prove by preponderance of evidence that at least one of four medical
conditions exists to trigger presumption).
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favor as "compelled by neither the text nor the history of the
regulation.

10 4

In Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 10 5 the Court analyzed the differences
between regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education & Welfare ("HEW") and those formulated by the DOL. 10 6 The Court
decided that DOL regulations made the criteria required to prove causation more restrictive than those of the HEW and, therefore, the DOL reg10 7
ulations violated the 1977 version of the Act.
In Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 10 8 the Court addressed the question, which it had alluded to but left unanswered in Pittston,of whether the
DOL rebuttal provisions were valid. 10 9 A majority of the Court, in finding
that the DOL regulations were no more restrictive than the original HEW
provisions, allowed the DOL to rebut the presumption of entitlement to
benefits if the evidence showed the miner did not have pneumoconiosis or
11 0
that the pneumoconiosis was not caused by coal mine employment.
Turning to the issue of attorney fees in black lung cases, the Court
upheld the DOL's fee limitation program as not being violative of due
process in United States Department of Labor v. Triplett.111
104. Id. at 156-57. The Fourth Circuit test was viewed as failing to conform to
both the text of the regulation and the legislative history surrounding it. See id. at
157 ("[T]hat conclusion is compelled by neither the text nor the history of the
regulation.").
105. 488 U.S. 105 (1988).
106. See id. at 105-06, 119 (holding that interim regulation by DOL violated
part of 1977 Act). The "DOL interim regulations were found more restrictive than
HEW regulations to the extent that the DOL invocation provision did not permit
invocation of the presumption without ten years of coal mining experience."
Cogan, supra note 6, at 1007.
107. See Pittston Coal Group, 488 U.S. at 106 (holding that interim DOL regula-

tion was more restrictive than HEW regulations in that DOL regulations only allowed invocation of presumption with 10 years of employment in coal mines). The
HEW regulations had also provided that a presumption could be invoked if proof
existed that the coal mine caused the pneumoconiosis. See id. Therefore, the
DOL regulations were only more restrictive as applied to miners with less than 10
years experience. See Mattingly & Hall, supra note 26, at 789-90 (stating that 10year requirement further restricted presumption for short-term workers).
108. 501 U.S. 680 (1991).

109. See id., at 689-90 (presenting question of whether DOL rebuttal provisions are "more restrictive" than HEW counterparts); Mattingly & Hall, supra note
26, at 790 (noting that failure to address question of whether DOL's rebuttal provisions were more restrictive than HEW's regulations invited controversy among

circuits).
110. See Pauley, 501 U.S. at 706 (affirming Third Circuit's judgment that DOL
has not acted inconsistently with 30 U.S.C. § 902(f) (2) (1986 & Supp. 1998)). Altough this case resolved the question of disability causation in pre-1981 cases, it left

open the causation question for claims filed after March 31, 1980. See Mattingly &
Hall, supra note 26, at 797 ("A conflict presently exists among the circuits concerning the standard of disability causation to employ in evaluating claims filed after 31
March 1980.").
111. 494 U.S. 715, 726 (1990). The disciplined attorney in this case tried to
make the claim that the fee scheme resulted in an unavailability of attorneys, but

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol43/iss5/5

20

Frabizzio: Black Lung Claims and Appeal in the Third Circuit: Which Way Do I

1998]

1043

CASEBRIEF

In the most recent major case, Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs v. Greenwich Collieries,"12 the Court used the black lung context to

strike down the true doubt rule and resolve a conflict among the circuits
over the validity of the rule."13 Normally, this issue arises when the claimant and the party opposing entitlement produce evidence that is equal on
both sides."14 In this situation, ALJs have traditionally shifted the burden
of proof to the party opposing entitlement.' 1 5 The Court put an end to
this practice by invalidating the rule due to a conflict with the Administrative Procedure Act 1 6 and thereby made it more difficult for a claimant to
1 7
prevail in this situation.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THIRD CIRCUIT APPROACH TO CLAIMS FOR

ENTITLEMENT TO BENEFITS UNDER THE BLACK LUNG

ACTS

In approaching the Third Circuit to appeal a denial of benefits to a
miner or a grant of benefits that the former employer believes was made
in error, it is essential for the practitioner to have an idea of how the court
may rule on the issue." 8 While the court has been sympathetic to the
interests of potentially diseased miners, as a general proposition, it has not
neglected its duty to follow the law.119
the Court rejected that argument. See id. (stating that evidence did not establish
that black lung claimants could not retain qualified counsel). The attorney in this
case was disciplined for entering into an unapproved, contingent-fee arrangement
with the claimant. See id. at 718 (describing sanctions imposed by Committee on
Legal Ethics of West Virginia State Bar).
112. 512 U.S. 267 (1994).
113. See id. at 280-81 (deciding that true doubt rule "runs afoul" of Administrative Procedures Act [APA] and holding that rule violates § 7(c) of APA).
114. See id. at 281 (noting that under DOL's true doubt rule, "when the evidence is evenly balanced the claimant wins"); William S. Mattingly, Federal Black
Lung Update, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 819, 819-20 (1994) (describing typical true doubt
situation in black lung case).
115. See Greenwich Collieries,512 U.S. at 272 (noting that when rule is invoked,
party opposing payment of benefits is charged with burden of persuasion). According to the APA, this would violate the tenet that the burden of persuasion
should always be on the one seeking benefits. See id. (discussing interplay between
§ 7(c) of APA and true doubt rule).
116. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).
117. See Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 280-81 (invalidating true doubt rule).
For a further discussion of the rationale behind this decision, see supra notes 11216 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g.,
Greg Geisman, Comment, Strengthening the Weak Link in the Family Law Chain: Child Support and Visitation as Complementary Activities, 38 S.D. L. REv.

568, 601 (1993) (noting that case law can provide hints to practitioner on how to
litigate future cases); Kristen Hay O'Neal & Andrew Weber, Comment, Procedural
Problems Under the Texas Administrative Procedure Act When Seeking Judicial Review of
Contested Case Decisions or Orders, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 883, 895 (1996) (stating that

"[t]he practitioner must carefully examine all of the relevant case law.., noting
the subtle differences in both the facts of each case and the analysis of each
court").
119. See Lango v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 104
F.3d 573, 574, 576-78 (3d Cir. 1997) (deciding that despite DOL's unseemly han-
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By examining Third Circuit law in contrast to the other circuits, this
section will provide an overview of the court's approach to several different issues in the appeals process. 120 This section will analyze Third Circuit
case law in terms of how other circuits and the Supreme Court have ruled
on the same issue. 12 1 Importantly, this analysis will demonstrate what role
public policy and a common sense idea of justice play in Third Circuit
122
jurisprudence.
As a preliminary matter, it is evident from the case law that the Third
Circuit has struggled to achieve a balance between recognizing the parade
of horribles that claimants bring before them and remaining faithful to
the language and purpose of the statute and regulations governing the
123
black lung claims and appeals process.
In Mancia, the court confronted the difficult task of interpreting a
death certificate that conflicted with the testimony of the miner's treating
physician who had signed the certificate.' 24 Although the court recognized that the ALJ had the power to reject a medical opinion "'that does
not adequately explain the basis for its conclusion,"' the Third Circuit decided that the ALJ went too far in categorizing the treating physician's
opinion as a mere assumption and thus allowing the death certificate to
dling of case, claimant did not present enough evidence to allow court to reverse
denial of benefits in this instance). Even in upholding the denial of benefits, however, the court suggested an alternate course that the claimant might take to reapply for benefits. See id. at 578 (suggesting that modification request may be
successful if claimant can procure another opinion from treating physician that
meets requirements of statutory scheme).
120. For a further discussion and examples of the Third Circuit's reasoning in
this complex area, see supra notes 38-99 and accompanying text.
121. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis as applied by
other circuits and the Supreme Court, see infra notes 122-51 and accompanying
text.
122. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in terms of public
policy and equitable concerns, see infra notes 123-51 and accompanying text.
123. Compare Mancia v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
130 F.3d 579, 593-94 (3d Cir. 1997) (using length of appeal process as factor in
awarding immediate benefits without remand, but not without deciding on basis
for award according to precedent and statutory language), and Keating v. Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 71 F.3d 1118, 1120 (3d Cir. 1995)
(describing "shamefully long" 17-year lapse in appeal process, but basing decision
to award benefits on ALJ's error in not admitting evidence), with Lango, 104 F.3d at
576-78 (upholding denial of benefits where claimant offered no testimony other
than death certificate, even where court had extensively discussed in dicta sad state
of appeals process).
124. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 581-82 (describing treating physician's opinion
that he had not ascribed cause of death to myocardial infarction in death certificate). In fact, the death certificate did list myocardial infarction as the cause of
death, but the court chose to believe the treating physician's testimony that he
used that designation as a matter of convenience. See id. at 582 (describing treating physician's opinion that decedent's "heart stopped on the basis of his underlying lung deterioration").
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trump it. 125 This lack of clarity in death certificates provided a problem
for the Third Circuit in the past. 126 Here, the Mancia court correctly decided that the probative value of the physician's testimony and his credibil127
ity as a witness outweighed the value given to his judgment by the ALJ.
At times, lay testimony can be important, especially in the case of a
survivor who is making a claim for benefits when the correct tests were not
necessarily performed during the deceased miner's lifetime. 128 In spite of
a change in the regulations that would seem to have changed the criterion
from considering "'all relevant evidence"' to a less broad standard, the
court admitted lay testimony in Mancia.1 29 At least one other circuit dis125. Id. at 588 (quoting Risher v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, 940 F.2d 327, 331 (8th Cir. 1991) and citing Brazzalle v. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs, 803 F.2d 934, 936 (8th Cir. 1986)). The
court also cited the Eighth Circuit in concluding that medical opinions do not
need to be "expressed in terms of reasonable degree of medical certainty." See id.
at 589 n.Il (concluding that reasonable medical judgment is sufficient) (citing
Drummond Coal Co. v. Freeman, 733 F.2d 1523, 1526 (8th Cir. 1984)); see also
Peabody Coal Co. v. Helms, 859 F.2d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 1988) (same). For a further discussion of medical judgments, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Hillibush v. Benefits Review Bd., 853 F.2d 197, 204 (3d Cir.
1988) (holding that death certificate does not invalidate presumption in favor of
claimant in absence of autopsy); Smakula v. Weinberger, 572 F.2d 127, 132 (3d
Cir. 1978) (noting all too common practice of filling out death certificates with
general designation of cardiopulmonary arrest or "coronary occlusion"); see also
Lango, 104 F.3d at 576-78 (stating that death certificate listed pneumoconiosis as
cause of death, but did not offer evidence of physician's reasoning).
127. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 588-89 (concluding that medical "assumptions"
based on medical history constitute "objective medical means" that ALJ mistakenly
claimed were not present); Tennessee Consol. Coal Co. v. Crisp, 866 F.2d 179, 185
(6th Cir. 1989) (finding that ALJ must accept physician's reasoned medical judgments, even if not meeting some arbitrary standard of certainty).
128. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 588 (noting that relevant lay testimony should be
considered, especially in face of conflicting medical opinions); Hillibush, 853 F.2d
at 203 (same).
129. See Mancia, 130 F.3d at 588 (noting that in spite of change in regulation,
court will not allow ALJ to "ignore uncontradicted relevant lay testimony where it
corroborates the medical testimony of a treating physician and is consistent with
the medical records"); see also 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c) (1998) (enacting stricter post1981 regulations). The regulations state:
For the purpose of adjudicating survivors' claims filed on or afterJanuary
1, 1982, death will be considered to be due to pneumoconiosis if any of
the following criteria is met:
(1) Where competent medical evidence established that the miner's
death was due to pneumoconiosis, or
(2) Where pneumoconiosis was a substantially contributing cause or
factor leading to the miner's death or where the death was caused by
complications of pneumoconiosis, or
(3) Where the presumption set forth at § 718.304 is applicable.
(4) However, survivors are not eligible for benefits where the
miner's death was caused by a traumatic injury or the principal cause of
death was a medical condition not related to pneumoconiosis, unless the
evidence establishes that pneumoconiosis was a substantially contributing
cause of death.
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agreed with this reasoning, finding that the ALJ did not err in failing to
consider lay testimony in a claim that arose after the change in regulations. 130 The Third Circuit's somewhat more liberal interpretation of the
change in regulations seems at odds with the post-1980 regulations' em1 31
phasis on more discrete tests for pneumoconiosis and causation.
In the case of a duplicate claim, a miner can only receive benefits if
there has been a material change in condition.13 2 Exemplifying the confusion among the various circuits over this regulation, the Third Circuit in
Labelle decided that in reviewing duplicate claims, an ALJ should construe
the test of "a material change in condition" as meaning that miners could
1 33
now disprove an element that had previously denied them entitlement.
Other circuits, specifically the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, have construed "a material change" as meaning that either
the miner did not have the disease at the time of the first claim, but now
has contracted it and become totally disabled by it, or the miner had the
disease at the time of the first claim, but it has now progressed to disable
the miner totally.134 Although neither test is "better" on its face, the Seventh Circuit test seems to blur the lines between the standards for a modi13 5
fication and those of a duplicate claim.
Relying partly on the true doubt rule in Kowalchick, the Third Circuit
decided that "equally probative but contradictory evidence in the record is
130. See Risher, 940 F.2d at 330 (deciding that post-1980 claims are governed
by regulation that does not mandate consideration of lay testimony).

131. See Nase, supra note 5, at 312-13 (stating that 1981 amendments to Act
.attempted to reduce outlays by tightening eligibility and even eliminating entitlement in certain cases").
132. See Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 316 (3d Cir. 1995)
(stating that if first claim is denied and duplicate claim is filed, material change in
condition must have taken place) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d) (1995); 20 C.F.R.
§ 725.309(d) (1998)).

133. See id. at 317 (agreeing with standard suggested by DOL that miners
could now disprove element that had previously denied them entitlement); see also
Sharondale v. Ross, 42 F.3d 993, 997-98 (6th Cir. 1994) (same).
134. See Sahara Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 946 F.2d 554, 556 (7th Cir. 1991) (construing material change as whether
disease had occurred after initial claim was denied or whether it had progressed to
stage of complex pneumoconiosis by time of duplicate claim); see also Lisa Lee
Mines v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 57 F.3d 402, 407
(4th Cir. 1995) (adopting similar test), reh'g en banc, 86 F.3d 1358 (4th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1090 (1997).
135. See Labelle, 72 F.3d at 317 (noting confusion that results from applying
Sahara standard and instead adopting recommendation of DOL). Nevertheless,
the Third Circuit cited the Sixth Circuit in noting that the Seventh Circuit standard in Sahara was reasonable. See id. (noting that Sixth Circuit adopted Seventh
Circuit material change standard in Sharondale,42 F.3d at 997); see also Keating v.
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 71 F.3d 1118, 1121-23 (3d
Cir. 1995) (noting that new evidence affecting presumptions that should have
been available to miner at time of first claim should have been analyzed by second
ALJ in modification hearing).
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to be resolved in the favor of the claimant." 13 6 In applying the rule to a
different provision of the Act, however, the Third Circuit subsequently
137
abandoned the rule as applied to black lung cases in Greenwich Collieries.
Although courts and commentators have criticized the effect of the
Supreme Court's affirmation of Greenwich Collieries,at least one author has
supported the Court's legal reasoning while suggesting that Congress codify the rule.138
Several commentators have noted the difficulty attached to interpreting the rebuttal provisions that accompany the interim presumptions of
the 1972 and 1977 Acts.' 3 9 Even when it has appeared as though the analysis is well understood, some circuits have deviated from the accepted line
of reasoning. 140 For example, while most circuits have held that the
136. Kowalchick v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 893
F.2d 615, 621 (3d Cir. 1990) (disagreeing with DOL's argument that evidence was
not "equal" because court looked to most recent x-ray as per Supreme Court direction). Because the evidence on both sides was deemed "equal," the court employed the true doubt rule and awarded the claimant benefits. See id. (stating that
evidence allowed miner to invoke presumption of disability).
137. See Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich
Collieries, 990 F.2d 730, 734 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that rule conflicted with regulation placing burden of proving by preponderance of evidence on party making
allegation), affd, 512 U.S. 267 (1994); 20 C.F.R. § 718.403 (1998) ("Except as provided in this subchapter, the burden of proving a fact alleged in connection with
any provision of this part shall rest with the party making such allegation.").
138. See Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 281 (holding that true doubt rule,
which allows claimant to win when evidence is evenly balanced, violated § 7(c) of
APA). The Supreme Court, in affirming a denial of benefits, agreed that the rule
was invalid, but on more general grounds. See id. (choosing not to address true
doubt rule's conflict with 20 C.F.R. § 718.403); see also Allan W. Brown, Comment,
Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries: The End of the True Doubt Rule, 97 W. VA.
L. REv. 1053, 1078 (1995) ("[T]he fate of the true doubt rule now rests with Congress, which has the power to codify the true doubt rule and overrule Greenwich.").
In an article written before the Supreme Court decision was handed down,
one commentator was interested in discovering how the Court would weigh the
apparently clear burden of proof on the claimant against the "humanitarian" aspects of the act. See Mattingly, supra note 114, at 821 (summarizing split among
circuits). He also cited the split among the circuits, with the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits coming out differently than the Third Circuit. See id. (discussing disparity
among circuits prior to Greenwich Collieriesdecision) (citing Skukan v. Consolidated
Coal Co., 993 F.2d 1228, 1236 (6th Cir. 1993), vacated, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994); Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 988 F.2d 706, 709-11 (7th Cir. 1993), vacated sub nom. Freeman United Coal
Mining Co. v. Jones, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994)).
139. See Mattingly, supra note 114, at 833 (stating that most recent confusion
stemmed from what was previously thought to be clear language of 20 C.F.R.
§ 727.203(b)(3) (1994)); Nase, supra note 5, at 280 (noting that adoption of
changes over years was result of Congress learning from experience); see also 20
C.F.R. § 727.203(b) (3) (stating that rebuttal of presumption is possible when "evidence establishes that the total disability or death of the miner did not arise in
whole or in part out of coal mine employment").
140. See Cort v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 996
F.2d 1549, 1551-53 (3d Cir. 1993) (deciding that 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b) (3) only
dealt with whether disability resulted in whole or in part from employment, not

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 5 [1998], Art. 5

1048

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43: p. 1023

miner must have a pulmonary impairment to rebut one particular section
14
of the interim presumptions, the Third Circuit has held otherwise.
In Pauley, another Third Circuit case invoking the rebuttal criteria
that was eventually resolved by the Supreme Court, the Court settled a
conflict among several circuits regarding the type of proof that could be
used to rebut a presumption of disability. 142 This conflict arose because,
according to the 1977 version of the Act, the DOL interim regulations
could not be more restrictive than the HEW regulations governing pre1973 claims. 143 In agreeing with the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court
held that the rebuttal criteria in the DOL regulations were no more re144
strictive than the HEW regulations.
whether miner had pulmonary or respiratory disability); Mattingly, supra note 114,
at 834-37 (noting that Third Circuit decision is illogical in allowing "applicants
with no pulmonary or respiratory disability to be shielded from rebuttal evidence
proving there is neither impairment nor disability arising out of coal mine
employment").
141. See Mattingly, supra note 114, at 833-34 n.83, 835 (noting that while several circuits allow opposing party to rebut 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b) (3) presumption
if there is no pulmonary impairment, Third Circuit recently denied opportunity to
rebut even where there was no impairment); see, e.g., Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v.
Weigand, 831 F.2d 926, 928 (10th Cir. 1987) (requiring presence of disability and
ruling out any relationship requirement between disability and coal mine employment to rebut presumption); Palmer Coking Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 720 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that
disability must be present). But see Cort, 996 F.2d at 1551-53 (deciding that 20
C.F.R. § 727.203(b) (3) only dealt with whether disability resulted in whole or in
part from employment, not whether miner had pulmonary or respiratory
disability).
142. See Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 689-90 (1991) (deciding three circuit cases that presented question of whether DOL regulations were
"more restrictive than" HEW regulations). Compare Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 890 F.2d 1295, 1301-02 (3d
Cir. 1989) (finding that DOL interim regulations are not more restrictive than
HEW regulations), aff'd, 501 U.S. 680 (1991), with Dayton v. Consolidated Coal
Co., 895 F.2d 173, 175 (4th Cir. 1990) (deciding to apply HEW regulations because
DOL regulations were more restrictive), rev'd sub nom. Pauley, 501 U.S. at 680, and
Taylor v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 895 F.2d 178, 180-81 (4th Cir. 1990) (same), rev'd
sub nom. Pauley, 501 U.S. at 680.
143. See Mattingly & Hall, supra note 26, at 788 n.6 (stating that Reform Act of
1977 provided that DOL regulations be no more restrictive than HEW
regulations).
144. See Pauley, 501 U.S. at 706 (holding that Secretary of Labor did not act
unreasonably in permitting "the presumption of entitlement to black lung benefits
to be rebutted with evidence demonstrating that the miner does not, or did not,
have pneumoconiosis or that the miner's disability does not, or did not, arise out
of coal mine employment"). One commentator noted that this case was decided
correctly because in spite of the fact that the dissent characterized the DOL regulations as less favorable to the claimant, Congress never intended the regulations to
be unrebuttable. See Mattingly & Hall, supra note 26, at 796 (listing ways regulations can be rebutted) (citing Pauley, 501 U.S. at 709-11 (ScaliaJ., dissenting)). In
the end, the claimant is still entitled to a strong presumption that will be difficult
for an opposing party to rebut. See id. at 796-97 (noting that analysis applies only
to claims filed before March 31, 1980); see also Cogan, supra note 6, at 1010 (illus-
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Although this conflict has been resolved for claims filed before March
1, 1980, claims filed after that time are still subject to conflicting views on
the standard of disability causation.' 45 This controversy, which revolves
around whether the court will require proof that either pneumoconiosis
was a substantial contributor to the miner's death or disability or simply
that a disabling impairment was caused in part by pneumoconiosis, should
be resolved by the Supreme Court or Congress.146 It should be noted that
147
the Third Circuit has adopted the more exacting test.
One final aspect that is evident across the circuits is the air of frustration regarding black lung cases affecting some of the judges serving on the
United States court of appeals level. One example of this frustration, evidenced by the Third Circuit in Plesh and in other circuits, is the courts'
problem with agencies that ignore difficult situations, hoping that they will
go away. 148 The Mancia and Keatingcourts also criticized the DOL, noting
trating role that other factors, such as physician's philosophy conflicting with purpose of rebuttal rules, may play in denying claimant's benefits).
145. See Mattingly & Hall, supra note 26, at 797 (stating that main conflict is
over what death or disability "'due to pneumoconiosis"' means); see also 20 C.F.R.
§ 718 (1994) (defining standard); Grant v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 857 F.2d 1102, 1105-07 (6th Cir. 1988) (validating judgment that
miner's breathing problems were not due to pneumoconiosis); Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1321-24, 1332-34
(3d Cir. 1987) (deciding standard of disability causation).
146. See Mattingly & Hall, supranote 26, at 798-99 (describing two main interpretations of "due to pneumoconiosis" provision and noting that Third and Eleventh Circuits will not award benefits when evidence shows that pneumoconiosis
played small role in disability); see also Lollar v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 893
F.2d 1258, 1267 (lth Cir. 1990) (adopting and finding substantial evidence);
Bonessa v. United States Steel Corp., 884 F.2d 726, 734 (3d Cir. 1989) ("[A] miner
must show that pneumoconiosis is a substantial contributor to the disability."). But
see Peabody Coal Co. v. Smith, 127 F.3d 504, 506-07 (6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting substantial evidence test in Bonessa); Robinson v. Pickands Mather & Co., 914 F.2d 35,
38 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that miner must prove by preponderance of evidence
that his pneumoconiosis was at least "contributing cause" of his totally disabling
respiratory impairment); Shelton v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, 899 F.2d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); Mangus v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, 882 F.2d 1527, 1531-32 (10th Cir. 1989)
(same).
147. For a further discussion of the test adopted by the Third Circuit for post1980 claims, see supra note 137 and accompanying text.
148. See Plesh v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 71
F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that handwritten note on letter sent back to
DOL constituted appeal of order of termination of benefits). In this case, the
DOL terminated a miner's benefits and then ignored a note on a letter that was
returned to them. See id. at 106. When a final order was issued terminating his
benefits, Mr. Plesh, the miner in that case, then submitted a new appeal that was
treated as a duplicate claim instead of a modification. See id. at 107. The court,
noting that it is more difficult for a claimant to prevail on a duplicate claim, decided that it constituted a modification. See id. at 112 (holding Plesh's handwritten
appeal valid).
In an Eleventh Circuit case with similar facts, the widow of a deceased miner
wrote a letter to the Board informing them that she wished to appeal a denial of
benefits to the court of appeals. See Cooley v. Director, Office of Workers' Coin-
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the protracted appeals process that had brought the widow of the diseased
miner before them. 149 Several commentators have also pointed out the
faults of the DOL appeals system, criticizing the courts, Congress and the
DOL regulations. 15 0 It is evident from the rankling on both sides of the
151
issue that the Act and its associated regulations have failed.
IV.

CONCLUSION AND PRACTITIONER RECOMMENDATIONS

Although the DOL has attempted to continue improving the Black
Lung Benefits Program through various changes in regulations and requests for public comment, there is seemingly little hope for the resolution of all of the outstanding issues.' 52 Despite this fact, as well as the fee
limitations set by the DOL, it is important that attorneys in the Third Circuit respond to the needs of claimants. 15 3 As is apparent from this brief
pensation Programs, 895 F.2d 1301, 1302 (11th Cir. 1990). Although the court was
forced to deny her filed petition because it was untimely, the court criticized the
Board for not calling the widow and advising her on how to proceed. See id. at
1303 n.2 ("[W]e can only hope that administrative agencies will act with greater
interest and vigilance in protecting a petitioner's right to appeal . . . ."). In addition, the court lamented the fact that it could not, at least at that time, consider
equitable considerations in deciding jurisdictional questions. See id. at 1303 (expressing view that something had gone wrong with system in this case).
149. See Mancia v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 130
F.3d 579, 593-94 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing widow's advanced age after protracted
appeals process as one rationale for expediting award of benefits to survivor); Keating v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 71 F.3d 1118, 1120
(3d Cir. 1995) (criticizing Board's contention that 17-year lapse between claims
demonstrated that widow was "shopping for a friendly factfinder").
150. See Mattingly, supra note 114, at 841 (describing exasperation of various
circuits with black lung program); Robert A. Campbell, Note, United States Department of Labor v. Triplett: Black Lung Claimants Will Continue to Suffer from a
Lack of Legal Representation, 93 W. VA. L. REv. 713, 713-14 (1991) (disagreeing with
Supreme Court decision in stating that black lung claimants will continue to suffer
from inadequate representation as result of mandatory DOL fee structure in black
lung cases). Even members of Congress, such as Austin Murphy, have criticized
the program. See Field Hearing on Improving the FederalBlack Lung Benefits Program,
103d Cong. 1-2 (1993) (statement of Rep. Austin Murphy) (stating that he has
heard complaints that program ignores "those it was meant to protect").
151. See Black Lung Amendments, WORKERS' COMPENSATION MONTHLY, Nov.
1997, at 22 (stating that Alliance of American Insurers has come out strongly
against proposed "burdensome, complicated, ambiguous, and costly" amendments
to Act). But see Black Lung Program Dying,WORKERS' COMPENSATION MONTHLY, May
1997, at 22 (noting dismal four percent claim-approval rate and stating that proposed regulations altering definition of pneumoconiosis would make bad situation
even worse).

152. See ESA ProposedRule (visited July 19, 1998) <http://gatekeeper.dol.gov/
dol/esa/public/regs/fedreg/proposed/97_12324.htm> (inviting public comment
on proposed DOL regulations for 1997).
153. See Earl F. Martin III, Comment, Limiting Attorney's Fees in Black Lung Benefits Cases: A Violation of ProceduralDue Process?, 2 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 375, 388-89
(1987) (arguing that present DOL attorney fee structure is so discretionary that it
is unreasonable and fearing that eventually there will be no attorneys left to take
cases). But see United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 726 (1990)
(holding that DOL's fee scheme does not violate claimants' due process rights).
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summary of the appeals process and case law of this circuit, a claimant
proceeding pro se has an almost insurmountable amount of twists and
15 4
turns through which to maneuver.
Because of the Third Circuit's depth of experience in this area, practitioners in the Third Circuit who accept black lung cases can be confident
that they will have a fair and knowledgeable panel if they appeal a denied
claim.1 55 The Third Circuit not only has experience in confronting the
15 6
difficult legal issues, but also in dealing with the equities of these cases.
While attorneys can be confident in the Third Circuit's legal analysis and
respect for precedent, they can also be sure that the Third Circuit will
respect the purpose of the Act and consider the effect of its ruling on the
claimant.
Joseph N. Frabizzio

154. See Plesh v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 71
F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 1995) (illustrating difficulty claimant may have with appeals
process). In Plesh, the claimant believed that he could appeal by sending in a
handwritten note. See id. (discussing process that claimant went through). If not
for the decision of the Third Circuit to treat the letter as an appeal, the claimant
might not have started receiving benefits again. See id. at 111-12 (discussing ease
with which claimant can become confused); see also Martin, supra note 153, at 388
(noting great "risk of erroneous deprivation to the claimant's rights if counsel is
removed").
155. See, e.g., Penn Allegheny Coal Co. v. Williams, 114 F.3d 22, 25 (3d Cir.
1997) (finding that all four criteria for establishing pneumoconiosis should be
considered together); Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 317 (3d Cir.
1995) (adopting test for "material change in condition" standard); Greenwich Collieries v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 990 F.2d 730, 734
(3d Cir. 1993) (deciding to eliminate true doubt rule), affd, 512 U.S. 267 (1994).
156. See, e.g., Mancia v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
130 F.3d 579, 593-94 (3d Cir. 1997) (awarding benefits immediately due to long
appeals process and age of widow); Lango v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 104 F.3d 573, 575-76, 578 (3d Cir. 1997) (criticizing DOL for
delays in appeals process and suggesting alternative way to appeal claims); Keating
v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 71 F.3d 1118, 1120 (3d
Cir. 1995) (rejecting accusation that claimant was "ALJ shopping" after 17-year
delay and awarding her benefits); Plesh, 71 F.3d at 111-12 (reinstating benefits to
miner even after nontraditional, handwritten appeal was ignored by Board).
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